Kazakhstan at a critical juncture in its energy policy. Faced with a mounting electricity deficit, peaking at 2.4 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 2024 and projected to reach 5.7 billion kWh by the end of 2025, the country has committed to nuclear power as a long-term solution to its energy crisis. In a closely watched decision, Kazakhstan selected Russia’s Rosatom to lead the construction of its first post-Soviet nuclear power plant (NPP). Though portrayed as the outcome of a competitive bidding process involving global contenders such as China’s CNNC, France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, the reality reveals deeper structural, historical, and geopolitical undercurrents.
Kazakhstan’s rationale for embracing nuclear power lies in the urgency of closing a widening energy gap. Domestic electricity generation totalled 117.9 billion kWh in 2024, while consumption surged to 120.4 billion kWh. With demand outstripping supply and a growing reliance on Russian electricity imports, 4.6 billion kWh in 2024 alone, the state is under pressure to secure stable, scalable, and clean baseload energy. Nuclear power, with its zero-carbon emissions and high output consistency, appears to be a logical choice.
Rosatom's selection, however, is not merely a technical or economic decision, it is a multifaceted strategic alignment. At first glance, the advantages of partnering with Rosatom seem practical. The company’s VVER 3+ generation reactors are among the most advanced in the world, already operating across multiple continents. Rosatom also offers one of the most financially accessible nuclear packages, often through the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, as seen in Turkey’s Akkuyu NPP. In this structure, Rosatom not only builds and equips the plant but may retain ownership, operate the facility, and provide ongoing fuel and maintenance services. For Kazakhstan, facing capital constraints, this model reduces upfront costs and guarantees technical support throughout the reactor’s lifecycle.
But Rosatom’s competitive edge is also the result of Russia’s long-term strategy to dominate the global nuclear sector. As detailed in our 2023 report Russia’s Nuclear Stranglehold, Russia is deeply embedded in every phase of the nuclear fuel cycle. Through Uranium One, a Rosatom subsidiary, Russia controls large portions of Kazakhstan’s uranium output, including stakes in mines such as Karatau, Akbastau, and Budenovskoye. Altogether, Rosatom’s interest in Kazakhstan’s uranium deposits exceeds 285 million pounds, a volume capable of powering the entire U.S. nuclear fleet for over 5 years.
Rosatom’s value proposition goes beyond engineering and fuel services. It is, in effect, a "one-stop nuclear shop." Its involvement typically includes not just construction, but workforce training, fuel rod production, reactor maintenance, and even educational exchanges. In nations lacking deep nuclear expertise, such as those in Central Asia, Africa, or the Middle East, Rosatom embeds itself in national infrastructures. Engineers are trained in Russia, control systems are Russian-made, and maintenance contracts tie the client state to Moscow for decades. This vertically integrated model creates systemic dependency, raising questions about national energy sovereignty.
From a geopolitical perspective, Kazakhstan’s choice of Rosatom reinforces long-standing ties with Russia, dating back to their shared Soviet legacy. The decision also reflects Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, which seeks to balance relations with Russia, China, and the West. While Rosatom will lead the construction of the first plant, China’s CNNC has reportedly been tapped for feasibility studies on a second. This division of labour appears designed to placate both regional powers, signalling Kazakhstan’s intent to please both Russia and China.